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NOTES
Pretrial Rights to Counsel Under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments: A Distinction Without a
Difference
In Brewer v. Williams,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled
inadmissible incriminating statements made by a murder suspect
after a detective's exhortation that the ten-year-old murder victim
deserved a "Christian burial.' Three years later, however, in
Rhode Island v. Innis,' the Court ruled admissible incriminating
statements made by a murder suspect after a policeman apprehen-
sively commented that a handicapped child might find and be in-
jured by the sawed-off shotgun used in the crime." Although the
results in these two cases, which share a "strikingly similar"5 fact
pattern, and which were decided by a Court with an unchanged
membership,' seem inconsistent upon initial examination, closer
1. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
2. Id. at 392-93. The defendant had surrendered to Dubuque police on an arrest warrant
issued in Des Moines. While enroute by auto from Dubuque to Des Moines, a police detec-
tive advised the defendant: "And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into
Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl
should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them
on Christmas [E]ve and murdered." Id.
3. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
4. Id. at 1691. The defendant had been arrested for robbery, although the police also
suspected him of murder. While being transported to the police station, one police officer
testified that he observed to another "[that because a school for handicapped children is
located nearby,] there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God
forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves." Id. at
1686-87.
5. White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right
to Counsel, 17 Am. Crim. L. REv. 53, 54 (1979) [hereinafter cited as White].
6. The members of the Supreme Court at the time both decisions were handed down
were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. The majority opinions in both Brewer and Innis were au-
thored by Justice Stewart. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 389; Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S.
Ct. at 4507. In Brewer, Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens joined Justice Stewart, and
each justice also filed a concurring opinion. 430 U.S. at 406 (Marshall, J.); id. at 409 (Powell,
J.); id. at 414 (Stevens, J.). Chief Justice Burger dissented, id. at 415; Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, id. at 429; and Justice
Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices White and Rehnquist joined, id. at
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scrutiny reveals that the two are reconcilable. In Brewer, the Court
held the evidence inadmissible because the defendant was interro-
gated in violation of his sixth amendment right to counsel.7 In In-
nis, the Court found that the defendant had not been interrogated
and therefore his statements were not elicited in violation of his
fifth amendment right to counsel. Thus, the evidence in Innis was
ruled admissible.8 Reconciling the two cases based upon the pres-
438. In Innis, Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined in Justice Stewart's
opinion for the majority, 100 S. Ct. at 1686. Justice White filed a separate concurrence, id.
at 1691, as did Chief Justice Burger, id. at 1691. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Bren-
nan, dissented, id. at 1692. Justice Stevens also dissented in a separate opinion, id. at 1693.
7. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 399. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part
that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The sixth amendment right to counsel has been the focus of a considerable amount of
scholarly comment, particularly after the Court's controversial decision in Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the Court greatly broadened the sixth amendment
right to counsel by holding that the privilege attached when a police investigation focused
upon a particular suspect. See notes 33-42 and accompanying text infra, for a fuller discus-
sion of Escobedo.
For a general overview of the sixth amendment right to counsel and the controversy pro-
voked by Escobedo, see Adam, The Right of an Accused to Counsel, 54 ILL. B.J. 308 (1965);
Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic
Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62 (1966); Dowling, Esco-
bedo and Beyond. The Need for a Fourteenth Amendment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56
J. CiuaM. L.C. & P.S. 143 (1965); English, Lawyers in the Station House?, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 283 (1966); Milledge, Escobedo - Toward Eliminating Coerced Confessions, 19 U.
MiAha L. Rzv. 415 (1965); Miller & Kessel, The Confession Confusion, 49 MAuQ. L. REV. 715
(1966); Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, Foreword: The High Court, the Great
Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56 (1965); Northrop, The
Supreme Court and Criminal Procedure, 26 MD. L. REV. 1 (1966); Robinson, Massiah, Es-
cobedo and Rationales for the Exclusion of Confessions, 56 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 412 (1965);
Rothblatt, Police Interrogation and the Right to Counsel, Post Escobedo v. Illinois: Appli-
cation v. Emasculation, 17 HASTNGS L. J. 41 (1965); Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79
H~Av. L. REv. 21 (1965); Taylor, The Supreme Court, the Individual and the Criminal
Process, 1 GA. L. REv. 386 (1967); Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation of Un-
counselled Suspects: The Supreme Court and the States, 44 B.U. L. REV. 423 (1964); Sym-
posium: Administration of Criminal Justice, Some Aspects of the Right to Counsel, 26 LA.
L. REV. 666 (1966); Note, The Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation: The After-
math of Escobedo, 53 CALi. L. Rev. 337 (1965); Note, The Coming of Massiah: A Demand
for Absolute Right to Counsel, 52 GEo. L.J. 825 (1964); Note, The Right to Counsel During
Police Interrogation, 25 MD. L. REV. 165 (1965); Note, Right to Counsel During Police In-
vestigation, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 804. For other authorities, see notes 15, 24 and 37 infra.
8. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1691. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o
person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), that the
presence of an attorney is required during interrogation, if requested by the defendant in
response to the Miranda warnings, to effectuate the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. at 466.
Miranda provoked a enormous quantity of comment, notably in the three year period
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ence or absence of interrogation, however, does not resolve the
problems raised by the cases. The Burger Court has established in
Innis and Brewer separate analytical rationales for the rights to
following announcement of the opinion. See, e.g., Arthur, Questioning by the Police Since
Miranda, 4 WILLAMcmrE L.J. 105 (1966); Elsen & Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under
Miranda v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1967); Goldstein, Administrative Problems in
Controlling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 160 (1967); Harris,
Miranda v. Arizona, Is It Being Applied?, 3 CuM. L. BULL. 135 (1967); Israel, Criminal
Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. Rev. 1320
(1977); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New'"
Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966); Rogge,
Proof by Confession, 12 VuL. L. Rzv. 1 (1966); Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interrogation:
Warnings and Waivers - Where Do We Go From Here?, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 479
(1967); Spring, The Nebulous Nexus: Escobedo, Miranda, and the New Fifth Amendment,
6 WASHBURN L.J. 428 (1967); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger
Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1978); Warden, Miranda - Some History, Some Observa-
tions, and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. Rev. 39 (1966); Symposium, Interrogation of Crimi-
nal Defendants - Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. Rev. 169 (1966);
Note, Criminal Procedure - Miranda: The Application of the Fifth Amendment Right
Against Self-Incrimination to Confessions - A Change in Approach, 16 BUFFALO L. Rev.
439 (1967); Note, Miranda v. Arizona: In-Custody Interrogation: An Examination of the
New Rules Further Defining the Suspect's Rights, 71 DICK. L. REv. 116 (1966); Note, Inter-
rogation of Criminal Suspects, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 660 (1964); Note, Criminal Law - Confes-
sions - The Restraints Society Must Observe Consistent With the Federal Constitution in
Interrogating Suspects, 18 S.C. L. Rv. 853 (1966); Note, The New Definition: A Fifth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 604 (1967); Note, Custodial Statements
of Criminal Suspects, 4 WaxAmErrm L.J. 189 (1966); Note, Miranda and Waiver, 4 Wn,-
LAmErr L.J. 205 (1966); Comment, Miranda v. State of Arizona - The Fifth Amendment
Enters the Police Station, 16 De PAUL L. Rev. 138 (1966); Comment, The New Right -
Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel, 20 U. MLum L. Rev. 893 (1966).
Later commentary focused upon the Burger Court's gradual restrictions of the scope of
the right to counsel (see, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)) and of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination (see, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
For later commentary, see Gangi, Confessions: Historical Perspective and a Proposal, 10
HOUSTON L. Rev. 1087 (1973); Gorecki, Miranda and Beyond - The Fifth Amendment
Reconsidered, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 295; Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitu-
tional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent, 72 MICH. L.
REv. 717 (1974); Steele, Developments in the Law of Interrogations and Confessions, 1
NATL. J. CiuM. DEMNSE 111 (1975); Note, Confessions By the Accused-Does Miranda Re-
late to Reality?, 62 KEN. L.J. 794 (1974); Note, Criminal Procedure - Michigan v. Mosley:
A New Constitutional Procedure, 54 N.C. L. REv. 695 (1976); Note, Constitutional
Law-Fifth Amendment - Suspect's Confusion About Miranda Rights, 36 OHIO ST. L.J.
220 (1975); Note, Michigan v. Mosley: A Further Erosion of Miranda?, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
Rev. 861 (1976); Note, Constitutional Law: Another Limitation on the Mandate of Mi-
randa v. Arizona and Further Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 27 U. FLA. L. Rev. 302
(1974); Note, United States v. Wade and On the Spot Identifications: Russell v. United
States, 30 U. Prrr. L. Rev. 517 (1969); Note, Right to Counsel at the Pretrial Hearing for
Probable Cause, 3 W. ST. U.L. Rev. 134 (1975); Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J.
390 (1967); Comment, Custodial Interrogation and the Fifth Amendment - A Passing
Shadow?, 12 CAL. W.L. Rev. 512 (1976); Comment, Right to Counsel at Photographic Line-
ups - People v. Lawrence, 1972 UTAH L. Rev. 100.
1980]
Loyola University Law Journal
counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments.9 When Brewer and
Innis are examined in conjunction with another case decided the
same term as Innis, United States v. Henry,'" this dichotomy be-
comes apparent. 1 In consequence, the Court has overlaid the law
of confessions with a complexity which the Chief Justice himself
believes is likely to result in confusion for both the lower courts
and law enforcement officers in determining the constitutionality
of police conduct. 2
Various rationales for the rights to counsel under the fifth and
sixth amendments, articulated in cases which preceded Brewer, In-
nis, and Henry, are set forth in this article. These theories provide
a basis for discussion of Innis and Brewer in light of Henry. As
this discussion illustrates, despite the emergence of separate ratio-
nales for the rights to counsel under the fifth and sixth amend-
ments, the same results might have been achieved through applica-
tion of a single test.'3 Recognition by the Court of the practicality
of a single test would eliminate judicial and police confusion re-
sulting from continued application of separate analyses for the
rights to counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments.
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment 1 4 origi-
9. See text accompanying notes 129-132 infra.
10. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
11. See text accompanying notes 129-30 infra.
12. Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. at 1691 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
13. See note 158 and accompanying text infra, and note 131 infra.
14. See note 7 supra. Historically, the amendment is rooted in the abhorence felt in the
American colonies for the anomalous rule in Great Britain under which counsel was pro-
vided in misdemeanors but not in felonies. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932).
Prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution, twelve of the thirteen colonies had
enacted statutory or constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to counsel, at least for
serious crimes. Id. at 64. See generally Note, An Historical Argument for the Right to
Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YmA L.J. 1000 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Histori-
cal Argument].
The Court appears, however, to have taken a step toward reversing England's historic rule
by restricting the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972), the Court ruled that an indigent defendant, absent waiver, may not be impris-
oned if convicted of a felony or misdemeanor without counsel. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979), the Court ruled, however, that the sixth amendment privilege does not attach to
a defendant who has been convicted of a misdemeanor, as long as the defendant is not
actually imprisoned. For a critical review of the Scott decision, see Herman & Thompson,
Scott v. Illinois and the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?, 17 Am.
CiuM. L. REv. 71 (1979).
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nally applied only to matters directly pertaining to trial.1" In Pow-
ell v. Alabama,16 the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel
to pretrial preparation as well as the trial itself, 7 relying upon the
due process clause,18 rather than the right to counsel under the
sixth amendment. A line of cases derived from Powell established
that the right to counsel.is to be measured in terms of whether the
"skill and knowledge"' and "guiding hand 20 of counsel are re-
quired in order to prevent the trial from becoming a "mere formal-
ity. 12 ' Based upon the theory that counsel could assist the suspect
at an earlier stage in the proceedings, the post-Powell cases placed
the right to counsel earlier on the prosecutorial continuum, first at
arraignment,22 then at the preliminary hearing, and then earlier
15. Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v.
Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REV. 47, 50 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Enker & Elsen]; Note, Develop-
ments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935, 997 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Confessions].
Limitation of the right to counsel to the trial setting derives from a strict reading of the
sixth amendment, a position taken by Chief Justice Burger: "If the Constitution provided
that counsel be furnished for every 'critical event in the progress of a criminal case,' that
would be another story, but it does not. . . . [Tihe Sixth Amendment states with laudable
precision that: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...have the Assistance of
Counsel.'" Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 23 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)(emphasis in
the original). See also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972)(Burger, C.J., concurring).
The limitation also derives from the fact that when the sixth amendment was enacted
"there were no organized police forces as we know them today." United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 224 (1967). At the time of the amendment's enactment, the primary confrontation
of the accused with the prosecution and the evidence against him was at the trial itself. In
contrast, modern police methods and judicial procedures have established pretrial proceed-
ings which frequently are dispositive of the issue of guilt or innocence. Id.
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17. Id. at 58. In Powell, the defendants, black youths, were convicted of raping two white
women. The trial was held moments after counsel was appointed. The Court held that the
defendants were denied the assistance of counsel "in any substantial sense." Id. "Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law
.... He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him." Id. at 69.
18. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part that
"no State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the sixth amendment right to counsel was
held to be a fundamental right applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
In so ruling, the Court held that counsel must be appointed to effectuate the sixth amend-
ment rights of indigent defendants. The Court thereby overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), which held that due process requirements could be met without the appoint-
ment of counsel.
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
20. Id.
21. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
22. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). The procedure for arraignment is statu-
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still at the initial appearance.' 4
The Court later retreated from the post-Powell expansion of the
suspect's pretrial right to counsel, holding that an unindicted sus-
pect was not necessarily entitled to counsel during interrogation.2 5
In its opinions, the Court employed a "voluntariness" analysis to
determine whether or not the suspect needed a lawyer based upon
age, education, and the circumstances under which questioning
had been conducted by the police.2s In addition to the voluntari-
tory. In Illinois, the arraignment takes place following the institution of formal charges by
way of indictment or information. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2 (1979). At the arraignment,
formal charges are presented to which the defendant is required to plead. Id. at § 113-1.
23. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Like the procedure for arraignment, see note
22 supra, the provisions for the preliminary hearing are also statutory. In Illinois, the judge
during a preliminary hearing is to determine whether or not probable cause exists to bind
the defendant over for trial. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3 (1979).
24. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963). The procedure for the initial appearance is
similarly statutory. See notes 22-23 supra. In Illinois, the initial appearance is to be held as
soon as practicable after the arrest of the suspect. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (1979). At
the hearing, the defendant is informed of the charges against him, of his right to counsel
and of his right to bail. Id.
In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), and
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), the Court applied what has been described by a
student commentator as a "functional" analysis, measuring the suspect's right to counsel by
whether the attorney's presence was necessary to assist the defendant at trial. Note, The
Pretrial Right to Counsel, 26 Stanford L. Rev. 399, 399 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pretrial
Right].
The sixth amendment has also been described as serving a "shield" function by protecting
the defendant from the unrestricted exercise of government power. Grano, Rhode Island v.
Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confes-
sions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Grano]. Grano points out that
sixth amendment rights are based upon the accusatorial, rather than inquisitorial, nature of
the American criminal justice system. Id. at 22-23. Thus, Grano states, the sixth amendment
guarantees the right to a speedy and public trial by jury, notice of the charges, the right to
confront witnesses, and compulsory process, in addition to the right to assistance of counsel.
Grano notes that this array of privileges has been described by Chief Justice Burger as "the
sporting theory of criminal justice." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 417 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). In Grano's view, however, the "sporting theory" is inapplicable prior to the
initiation of formal judicial proceedings. Until formal proceedings have begun, the system
does have inquisitorial features, including police interrogation and the grand jury. Id. at 23-
24. Accord, United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980). Historically, the inquisitorial and
accusatorial modes date to Anglo-Saxon law at the time of the Norman Conquest. M. BER-
GER, TAKING THE FIrH 3-14 (1980) [hereinafter cited as BERGER]. The inquisitorial mode
declined in favor only because of the desire of the English monarchy to wrest power from
the Church. Id. at 39.
25. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
26. Crooker advanced the argument that the right to counsel should be based on "the
sum total of the circumstances." Croaker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440 (1958). The defen-
dant in that case had completed one year of law school during which he had studied crimi-
nal law. The Court therefore held that the denial of counsel was not fundamentally unfair.
Id. The Court has also employed the voluntariness analysis in a fifth amendment context.
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ness analysis, the Court also gradually advanced a second rationale
supporting the right to counsel: the need to deter unlawful police
conduct.27 Whereas earlier cases focused upon the need to preserve
the accused's rights at trial, the Court began to articulate the posi-
tion that involuntary confessions are abhorrent not only because
they are inherently unreliable, but also because of "the deep-
rooted feeling that the police must obey the law."
28
The Court in United States v. Massiah29 relied upon this police
deterrence rationale, as well as the suspect's pretrial need for coun-
sel, in holding that the sixth amendment precludes the surrepti-
tious elicitation of incriminating statements from a defendant who
has been indicted and who has retained a lawyer.3 0 Massiah's
greatest significance, however, lies in its establishment of a point at
See notes 57-63 and accompanying text infra.
27. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959). The defendant in Spano was a 25-
year-old immigrant with a junior high school education. Accompanied by counsel, he surren-
dered to police after his indictment for murder. After his lawyer left the police station, he
was questioned almost continuously for eight hours by as many as fifteen police officers and
county prosecutors who ignored his requests for counsel. 360 U.S. at 315-19. He confessed
after his friend Bruno, a rookie officer, falsely stated that he, Bruno, would lose his job
unless Spano confessed. The Court held that these circumstances rendered the confession
involuntary. Id. at 317. The Court in Spano declined to overrule Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958) and Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 503 (1958), noting that the police in Spano
dealt with an indicted defendant, while Crooker dealt only with a suspect. 360 U.S. at 323.
The Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), however, specifically overruled
Crooker and Cicenia to the extent that these two cases preclude attachment of the right to
counsel prior to indictment. Id. at 492. Escobedo, however, was substantially undercut by
the Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). See notes 33-42 and accompanying text
infra.
28. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959). The Court's analysis in Spano is an
example of the interrelationship of "legal" and "factual" guilt. Under the doctrine of legal
guilt, certain threshhold requirements must be met by the judicial system before it may
proceed to a determination of the defendant's factual guilt. Chase, The Burger Court, the
Individual, and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518,
520-21 (1977). Thus, a defendant cannot be legally guilty (though there may be little doubt
about his factual guilt) if his conviction resulted from unconstitutional police conduct. Id.
Chase concludes that the Burger Court is preoccupied with factual guilt and is therefore
unwilling to reverse the convictions of defendants who are factually guilty, despite govern-
ment behavior which renders them legally innocent. Id. at 588.
29. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
30. Id. at 206. Although the Massiah Court limited the right to counsel to post-indict-
ment interrogation, Justice White in his Massiah dissent correctly predicted the expansion
of the right which came in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). "[Tjoday's rule
promises to have wide application well beyond the facts of this case. . . whether there has
been an indictment or not." Id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting). In Massiah, the government
hired an informer to engage the defendant, who had been indicted, in a conversation upon
which government agents eavesdropped through a hidden transmitter. The defendant's
counsel was not present. Id. at 202.
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which the sixth amendment right to counsel is automatically trig-
gered: the initiation of formal judicial proceedings.81 Once proceed-
ings are initiated by the defendant's appearance in court, the doc-
trine of Massiah requires that no interrogation take place in the
absence of counsel, based upon the dual rationales of deterrence of
law enforcement misconduct and the need of the suspect for the
assistance of an attorney.82
Massiah's holding that the right to counsel attaches only after
formal charges are filed has survived despite a temporary depar-
ture from that rule in Escobedo v. Illinois." In Escobedo, the
Court applied both the police deterrence" and the suspect's need
for counsel 5 rationales and held that the sixth amendment re-
quires that the police honor the request for counsel of a suspect
upon whom police suspicion has focused, whether or not an indict-
ment has been procured." The "focus test"8 7 for attachment of the
31. Id. at 206.
32. Id.
33. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34. See Pretrial Right, supra note 24. The Court relied upon language in Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); United States v. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964); and Ham-
ilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). The Court continued that "[i]t would exalt form
over substance to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether
at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal indictment." 378 U.S.
at 486. Failure to provide counsel at the suspect's request prior to indictment or arrest
"would make the trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation." Id. at 486-87. The
Court cited with approval the language in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (Black, J.,
dissenting) which stated that permitting counsel only after the onset of formal proceedings
would render a trial a "hollow thing, .. [since] the conviction is already assured by pretrial
examination." Id.
35. Danny Escobedo had been held by police and interrogated despite persistent re-
quests for his retained counsel and despite repeated efforts by that attorney to breach po-
lice-imposed barriers to consult with his client. 378 U.S. at 479-81. Escobedo made an in-
criminating statement concerning the murder he was suspected of committing (" 'I didn't
shoot Manuel, you did it,"' spoken to another suspect). Id. at 482-83. In ruling that state-
ment inadmissible, the Court relied not only upon Escobedo's need for an attorney, but also
upon the need to deter police misconduct. "We have learned the lesson of history, ancient
and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'con-
fession' will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which
depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation." Id. at
488-89.
36. Id.
37. During its brief life, Escobedo caused considerable controversy. See, e.g., Enker &
Elsen, supra note 15; Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interroga-
tion, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449 (1964); Comment, The Curious Confusion Surrounding Escobedo
v. Illinois, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 560 (1965); Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Tray-
nor]. See also note 7 supra.
Pretrial Rights to Counsel
sixth amendment right to counsel was short-lived.88 By 1972, the
Court in Kirby v. Illinois" limited the application of the right to
counsel to suspects against whom formal prosecutorial proceedings
have begun,'" thus returning to the rule of Massiah.41 Escobedo
was characterized in Kirby as a fifth amendment case in which the
right to counsel was necessary to effectuate the defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The Kirby Court also limited Esco-
bedo to its facts.42 Thus, Massiah's holding that the right to coun-
sel attaches only at the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings
remains intact.
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Because there is considerable overlap between the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel and the fifth amendment right to counsel, a
discussion of the fifth amendment43 is fundamental to considera-
tion of recent developments in both areas of the law." Until the
landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,46 the suspect's right to
counsel was predicated entirely upon the sixth amendment. The
fifth amendment right to counsel found by the Court in Miranda
fostered considerable overlap of the rights to counsel under both
amendments. 46 After Miranda, the previously-established stan-
dards for excluding confessions based upon their untrustworthi-
38. Escobedo was cited as precedent for a pre-arraignment right to counsel in a police
line-up case. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972). See also Pretrial Right, supra note 24, at 407.
39. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
40. Id. at 690-91. The Court's labelling of Escobedo as a "seeming deviation from this
long line of constitutional decisions," id. at 689, has been criticized in a student note as an
unduly narrow reading of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). Pretrial Right, supra
note 24, at 411.
41. Prior to the Court's decision in Brewer, "lasting fame had eluded" Massiah.
Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation'? When Does
It Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. 1, 24 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar]. The impact of the
opinion was lost in the controversy over Escobedo and Miranda, Kamisar observes. Mas-
siah, until Brewer, was viewed simply as a steppingstone to Escobedo. Id. at 25. In United
States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980), however, the Court emphasized the importance of
Massiah in sixth amendment right to counsel analysis. See text accompanying note 123
infra.
42. 406 U.S. 682 at 689. The continued validity of Escobedo is questionable. Escobedo's
demise is underscored by the Court's failure to include a single reference to it in the Court's
most recent sixth amendment case, United States v. Henry, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980). See
notes 121-28 and accompanying text infra, for a discussion of the Henry case.
43. See note 8 supra.
44. See text accompanying notes 73-128 infra.
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. See text accompanying notes 64-72 infra.
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ness47 and involuntariness"8 have been viewed as having only his-
torical significance."9 They will be examined here in some depth,
however, since the Burger Court appears to be returning to these
standards.50
1. Pre-Miranda Standards
As early as 1884, the Supreme Court used the word "voluntary"
in considering whether or not a confession was admissible.51 A con-
fession not induced by proffered benefits or threats was held to be
reliable and trustworthy and therefore admissible.52 In 1897, the
Court linked the law of voluntary confessions with the constitu-
tional privilege agsinst self-incrimination."3 Whereas the voluntari-
ness rule was aimed at excluding false confessions, the Court
viewed the due process requirement as designed "to prevent funda-
mental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.""
Although the Court later indicated that it was not certain whether
47. See text accompanying notes 51-62 infra.
48. Id.
49. See Confessions, supra note 15, at 954-96; and BERGER, supra note 24, at 1-24, for a
detailed treatment of the evolution of these standards.
50. See note 164 and accompanying text infra.
51. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
52. Id. at 585. Confessions were accepted and even encouraged as permissible methods of
obtaining convictions in early common law, despite the fact that certain of them may have
been extracted by torture. The notion that such confessions might be unreliable was not
raised in Great Britain until 1783. BERGES, supra note 24, at 6.
The infamous oath ex officio, under which the accused was required to respond truthfully
to questions put to him, was introduced in England in 1236 by a French cardinal. Id. It was
abolished by Parliament in 1662 only after a controversial 400 years of use. Id. at 21. Berger
discusses the sedition trial of John Lilburne, a crusader against the oath, in which Lilburne
described his objections to it. "I am not willing to answer you to any more of these ques-
tions, because I see you go about by this Examination to ensnare me." Trial of John Lilburn
(sic) and John Wharton, for Printing and Publishing Seditious Books, 3 Howm.L's STATE
TIALS 1315, 1318 (1637), as cited in BERGER, supra note 24, at 15-16. Predictably, the treat-
ment of the privilege in the American colonies in the 1600's was a reflection of the uncertain
state of the privilege in England, but the British use of inquisitorial techniques in the Colo-
nies led to inclusion of the fifth amendment in the Bill of Rights. In contrast, the colonies
were unified in their early statutory and constitutional provisions for the right to counsel
under the sixth amendment. See note 14 supra. Torture and even death were the penalties
for those who refused to incriminate themselves in the Salem witch trials of 1692. BERoR,
supra note 24, at 21.
53. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). A student commentator has described
the Brain Court's injection of constitutional standards into the law of confessions as "puz-
zling," Confessions, supra note 15, at 960, since the Court assumes an historical connection
in earlier cases between the constitutional privilege and the confessions rule which does not
necessarily exist. Id.
54. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
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involuntary confessions were to be excluded because they violated
the fifth amendment or because they were untrustworthy,8 it
seems apparent that the Court viewed due process as requiring a
fact-finding process based upon reliable, accurate information. 0
Deterrence of improper police methods became an additional
factor in the Court's treatment of alleged violations of the sus-
pect's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 57 In a
1961 case, for example, the Court said that confessions are neces-
sary but that consideration must also be given to the "basic notion
that the terrible engine of the criminal law is not to be used to
overreach individuals who stand helpless against it." 8
Although the goals of the voluntariness test were expressed with
sufficient clarity by the Court, the elements of the test remained
unclear.59 A somewhat abstract amalgamation of factors for evalua-
tion of police conduct and the perceptions of the suspect
emerged. 60 Among those factors were the conditions of detention,
the attitude of police toward the suspect, the physical and mental
state of the suspect, and the "diverse pressures which sap or sus-
tain (the suspect's) powers of resistance and self-control." ' The
55. United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951).
56. Confessions, supra note 15, at 960. "There was, however, no conception that the
interrogation that yielded the confession should conform to a standard of procedural regu-
larity, or that institutional safeguards had to be provided during interrogation as they were
at trial, or that the extent to which such regularity or safeguards were lacking bore directly
on the admissibility of a confession." Id. at 962. But see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936), in which the Court excluded a confession extracted by torture. Kamisar views this
case as possibly based upon the Court's desire to protect the integrity of the fact-finding
system. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 511 (4th ed. 1974)
(hereinafter cited as KAMISAR & LAFAVE]. The case can also be viewed as based upon due
process requirements of a fair trial. See Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 805-6 (1970).
57. Confessions, supra note 15, at 969. See also Herman, The Supreme Court and Re-
strictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 454 (1964).
58. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961). See note 27 supra for the methods
the police used to extract a confession in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See also
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (defendant held incommunicado for sixteen
hours; confession excluded); and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)(confession ex-
cluded when defendant detained and continuously interrogated for 36 hours).
59. For commentaries critical of the voluntariness test, see, e.g., Kamisar, What is an
"Involuntary" Confession?, 17 RUT. L. REv. 728 (1963); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the
Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 99, 102-3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stone]; Dix, Mis-
take, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 275.
60. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
61. Id. at 602. "No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interroga-
tion has been evolved." Id. at 601. In Culombe, the Court ruled inadmissible the confession
of a mentally deficient suspect who was held five days and questioned intermittently.
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ambiguity of the voluntariness test, as evidenced by these factors,
required a case-by-case analysis of whether or not police interroga-
tion had exceeded permissible bounds, thus placing an increased
workload on the courts.'e Not until the Court granted certiorari in
Miranda was it able "to give concrete constitutional guidelines for
law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.""e
2. The Impact of Miranda on the Right to Counsel
The Miranda decision was squarely based on the fifth amend-
ment." The Court, however, merged the fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights to counsel in its analysis. The Court stated that the
right attached at the initiation of police interrogation to insure
62. Stone, supra note 59, at 103; BEaGE, supra note 24, at 110. Berger illustrates the
extent of the scrutiny required under the voluntariness test with two cases. In Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), the Court ruled inadmissible a confession obtained after 36
hours of interrogation. In Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), the confession was excluded
when the defendant had been held and interrogated for a week with insufficient food and
sleep. Yet in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951), the Court ruled voluntary a confes-
sion obtained from an illiterate Mexican farm hand detained for four days. See BRER,
supra note 24, at 110-11.
A source of confusion with the voluntariness concept, Berger notes, is the word itself,
which seems to connote a degree of spontanaeity and lack of coercion which would preclude
any interrogation whatsoever by police. Id. at 111-12. That the Court has been unwilling to
apply such a literal definition is illustrated by Frankfurter's opinion for the majority in
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961): "such questioning is often indispensible to
crime detection." Id. at 571. The confusion of the state courts, and their tendency to apply
the vague voluntariness test to admit confessions later ruled unconstitutional by the Court
led to the increased workload. Stone, supra note 59, at 102-3.
63. 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966). It is interesting to note that the first two occasions upon
which, prior to Miranda, the Court began to resolve the ambiguities of the voluntariness
test were in sixth amendment settings, in which the Court ruled that the right to counsel
precluded police interrogation and required exclusion of the resulting confessions. The
Court ruled in United States v. Massiah, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), that police interrogation was
impermissible when an indicted defendant had retained an attorney. And in Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the Court established the focus test. See notes 33-42 and ac-
companying text supra.
Prior to Miranda, the Court had imposed somewhat stricter standards upon federal
courts than those imposed upon state courts by the voluntariness test. The Court in Mc-
Nabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), ruled that a suspect must be taken before a
magistrate for an initial appearance without unnecessary delay. A confession obtained dur-
ing such a delay is inadmissible. The Court took a tentative step toward a per se rule in
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), by holding that a seven-hour delay was suffi-
cient, under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to require exclusion of
the confession. When Mallory is read with McNabb, it is clear that the Court was engaged
in an exercise of its federal supervisory power over the federal courts to impose stricter
standards for police interrogation. These standards, however, also lacked certainty. BERGER,
supra note 24, at 115. For a general discussion of the McNabb-Mallory rule, see Hogan &
Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Gao. L.J. 1 (1958).
64. 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
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that police conduct comported with the suspect's privilege against
self-incrimination." Furthermore, the Court stated that the pres-
ence of counsel during police interrogation was necessary to effec-
tuate the protection of the suspect's rights at trial.66
Under Miranda, arresting police officers are required to inform
the suspect of his rights, including the right to counsel during in-
terrogation, prior to beginning any interrogation.67 After advising
the suspect, police must then adhere to two seemingly strict proce-
dures."8 First, "[ilf the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain si-
lent, the interrogation must cease."' 9 Once the suspect indicates an
intent to exercise the fifth amendment privilege, any subsequent
statement without counsel present or without subsequent waiver of
the privilege is necessarily coerced.70 The second procedure which
police must follow, once Miranda warnings have been given, is that
"[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interroga-
tion must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the indi-
vidual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and
to have him present during any subsequent questioning. 7 1 This
procedure is based upon a sixth amendment rationale, and again,
police must comply with this procedure, unless waiver of counsel
can be shown.7 2
65. Id. at 466.
"The denial of the (Escobedo) defendant's request for his attorney thus undermined his
ability to exercise the privilege - to remain silent if he chose or to speak without intimida-
tion, blatant or subtle. The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be
the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation con-
form to the dictates of the privilege. His presence [counsel's] would insure that statements
made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." Id.
(emphasis added).
66. Id. at 470. "[T]he need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege com-
prehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires." Id.
67. Prior to any interrogation, the accused must be warned of his right to remain silent;
that any statement may be used as evidence against him; that he has a right to have counsel
present during interrogation; and that if he is indigent, appointed counsel will be provided
if interrogation takes place. 384 U.S. 436, at 445.
68. The Court ruled in Innis that the police officers' dialogue did not constitute interro-
gation. The Court's narrow definition, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in Innis, under-
cuts the spirit of Miranda which requires a broad definition of "interrogation." 100 S. Ct. at
1693-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See notes 147-50 and accompanying text infra.
69. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
70. Id. at 474.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 475. The issue of whether or not waiver should be more difficult under the
sixth amendment than it is under the fifth amendment is unresolved. See note 120 infra.
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THE Brewer-Innis-Henry TRILOGY
1. Brewer v. Williams
A violation of the defendant's self-incrimination privilege under
Miranda was the first of three grounds cited by the District Court
when it granted habeas corpus to the defendant in Brewer v. Wil-
liams s.7 The District Court also found that Williams had been de-
nied his right to counsel under the sixth amendment.7' Finally, the
District Court observed that there had been no waiver by Williams
of the sixth amendment right to counsel.75 Therefore, the court
concluded that involuntary statements had been impermissibly in-
troduced into evidence against hims.7  The Eighth Circuit affirmed
on fifth and sixth amendment grounds.7 The Supreme Court de-
clined to consider the fifth amendment and involuntariness claims,
and upheld the Court of Appeals solely on sixth amendment
grounds.78
In Brewer, a warrant was issued for defendant Williams, a
mental hospital escapee, following the disappearance of a ten-year-
old girl from the Des Moines YMCA where Williams was then liv-
ing.7 1 Williams surrendered to police in Davenport, Iowa, after con-
sulting with a Des Moines attorney. Williams then was arraigned,
and after the arraignment was advised by a Davenport attorney.80
73. 375 F. Supp. 170, 180 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
74. Id. at 177.
75. Id. at 181.
76. Id. at 178.
77. 509 F.2d 227 (1975).
78. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Kamisar finds the Court's choice of the sixth amendment route
inexplicable. Kamisar, supra note 41, at 4-5. He notes that selection of a fifth amendment
basis for the Brewer decision would have eliminated the necessity for consideration of
whether or not the Christian burial speech constituted interrogation. Id. Kamisar believes,
however, that there is a right to counsel under Massiah regardless of whether or not interro-
gation has been initiated. Id. Professor Grano, who is at odds with Kamisar on numerous
issues, agrees with him on this point. Grano, supra note 24, at 32-33. Brewer, however, re-
jects this position. "[N]o such constitutional protection would have come into play if there
had been no interrogation." 430 U.S. at 400.
Although the Court upheld the reversal of the defendant's conviction, it gave the prosecu-
tion a broad hint as to a more successful theory on retrial. While Williams' statement di-
recting the police to the location of the body must be excluded, the Court said the evidence
may be admissible under the theory that police would eventually have discovered it, even
without guidance from Williams. Id. at 406-7, n. 12. On retrial, Williams was convicted fol-
lowing the trial court ruling that the evidence should be admitted under the theory recom-
mended by the Court. (unpublished opinion), KAMISAR & LAFAVE, supra note 56, 1980 sup-
plement at 226.
79. 430 U.S. at 390-91.
80. Id. at 391.
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Both lawyers counselled him against making any statements to po-
lice, and the police promised that Williams would not be interro-
gated during the 160-mile auto trip from Davenport to Des
Moines.81 Detective Leaming, one of the police officers who accom-
panied Williams on the trip, knew that Williams was a former
mental patient and knew that Williams was deeply religious. 2
Shortly after leaving Davenport, Learning, addressing Williams as
Reverend, gave the "Christian burial" speech.8 Cautioning the de-
fendant not to answer, Learning urged him nonetheless to "think
about" the fact that an impending snowstorm might prevent dis-
covery of the girl's body and that her parents were entitled to a
Christian burial of the child, who disappeared on Christmas Eve."
Williams then directed police to the body.8 He was indicted on
murder charges and convicted by a jury.8 6
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on three grounds,
based on a sixth amendment analysis. First, the Court stated that
Williams had a sixth amendment right to counsel, which attached
when judicial proceedings were initiated with the defendant's ar-
raignment.8 7 Williams clearly exercised that right by consulting
two attorneys prior to his ill-fated drive to Des Moines. Second,
the Court found that although not one sentence of the Christian
burial speech was punctuated with a question mark, "Detective
Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information
from Williams just as surely as - and perhaps more effectively
than - if he had formally interrogated him." 88 Thus, the speech
constituted interrogation after the sixth amendment privilege had
81. Id.
82. Id. at 390-92.
83. While enroute by auto from Dubuque to Des Moines, a police detective advised the
defendant: "And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I
feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be
entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christ-
mas [E]ve and murdered." Id. at 392-93.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 393.
86. Id. at 392-94.
87. Id. at 398. See note 78 supra.
88. Id. at 399. The issue of whether interrogation is possible without express questioning
appears to be raised and answered in the negative by Chief Justice Burger in his Brewer
dissent. Id. at 419-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Kamisar offers Brain v. United States, 168
U.S. 532 (1897) and Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) inter alia, as examples of
interrogation without the use of questions punctuated with question marks. Kamisar, supra
note 41, at 15-16. In any case, Innis apparently settles the matter. See notes 106-11 and
accompanying text infra.
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been invoked. Finally, the Court held that the government had not
met its "heavy burden" 8 of showing waiver. The standard to be
applied, the Court stated, was whether the government could show
the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege."'90
2. Innis v. Rhode Island
The facts in Innis v. Rhode Islands1 closely parallel those of
Brewer."9 Nevertheless, the Innis Court ruled the suspect's incrim-
inating statements admissible." In Innis, the defendant was ar-
rested by Providence, Rhode Island police as a suspect in a shot-
gun robbery of a taxicab driver. After Miranda warnings were
administered, Innis said that he understood his rights and wanted
a lawyer.' 4 Enroute to the police station, the two police officers ac-
companying Innis testified that they had the following
conversation:
Patrolman Gleckman: At this point, I was talking back and
forth with Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area
while on patrol and [that because a school for handicapped chil-
dren is located nearbyj there's a lot of handicapped children run-
ning around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a
weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.
Patrolman McKenna: I more or less concurred with him (Gleck-
man) that it was a safety factor and that we should, you know,
continue to search for the weapon and try to find it.'5
Immediately thereafter, Innis told the officers to return to the
scene of the arrest, promising that once there he would tell them
89. 430 U.S. at 402.
90. Id. at 404. This standard was first announced in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938).
Chief Justice Burger in his Brewer dissent raises an issue which lurks unresolved in the
background of many. of the Court's decisions, and which the Court has yet to address
squarely: whether a suspect who invokes the right to counsel may waive that right in the
absence of counsel. 430 U.S. at 418-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Kirby v. United
States, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Burger con-
tends in Brewer that the right is a personal one and that Williams clearly waived it. 430
U.S. at 417-18.
There is some indication that the Court views the sixth amendment right to counsel as
more difficult to waive than the fifth amendment right to counsel. See note 120 infra.
91. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
92. See White, supra note 5.
93. 100 S. Ct. at 1691 (1980).
94. Id. at 1686.
95. Id. at 1686-87.
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the location of the shotgun.9 At the scene, Innis was again advised
of his Miranda rights, but said he wished to show the officers the
location of the gun immediately because of the handicapped chil-
dren.Y Innis guided police to the gun, and this evidence and his
statements were used to convict him on charges of kidnapping,
robbery, and the shotgun murder of another taxicab driver.es
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, relying upon Brewer, re-
versed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that the de-
fendant had invoked his right to counsel under Miranda, that the
police officers' statements constituted interrogation, and that Mi-
randa required that all interrogation cease until an attorney was
present.99 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
address for the first time the meaning of 'interrogation' under Mi-
randa v. Arizona."100
Initially, the Supreme Court observed that the procedural safe-
guards detailed in Miranda apply in the context of "custodial in-
terrogation,"' 01 and that once the right to counsel is invoked, all
questioning must cease until an attorney is present. It was undis-
puted that the defendant in Innis was fully informed of those Mi-
randa rights, was in custody, and had invoked his right to counsel.
Simply, the issue was whether the respondent had been
"interrogated.''0
Although the Court in Innis stated that the Miranda Court's
definition of interrogation as "questioning" could be construed to
preclude only "express questioning," it declined to employ this re-
strictive definition. 08 The Court added that in so holding, it was
96. Id. at 1687.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Innis v. Rhode Island, 391 A.2d 1158, 1161-62 (1978).
100. Innis v. Rhode Island, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1687 (1980).
101. Id. at 1688. The question is generally settled that interrogation in the absence of
custody does not require the administration of Miranda warnings. See Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (no Miranda warnings required when agents of the Internal
Revenue Service interview suspect in his home); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977)
(no Miranda warnings required when burglary suspect, who is also a parolee, comes volunta-
rily to the police station for questioning). Several commentators believe that a suspect such
as the one in Mathiason is entitled to counsel. See Smith, The Threshhold Question in
Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation, 25 S.C. L. Rav. 699 (1974);
Graham, What is "Custodial Interrogation'?: California's Anticipatory Application of Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 59 (1967).
102. 100 S. Ct. at 1688.
103. Id. While the Court explicitly refused to interpret Miranda as barring only express
questioning, Justice Stevens in his dissent argues that the test formulated by the Court,
accomplishes precisely that result. 100 S. Ct. at 1696 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See text ac-
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not indicating that all statements made to police by a defendant in
custody were necessarily the product of interrogation.I Rather, in
order to be considered interrogation, the police behavior "must
relfect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself."10
The Court then announced the new test for determining if police
conduct constitutes interrogation: "Miranda safeguards come into
play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its functional equivalent."106 The functional
equivalent of express questioning constitutes "any words or actions
on the part of the police. . . that the police should know are rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the sus-
pect."' 07 Therefore, the focus becomes the "perceptions of the sus-
pect, rather than the intent of the police."' 08 Notwithstanding the
Court's insistence upon the primacy of the suspect's perceptions,
the Court in effect imposed an intent requirement upon police con-
companying notes 106-11 infra.
104. 100 S. Ct. at 1688. The Court's holding in Innis that volunteered statements are
admissible is analogous to rulings in two circuits that statements made by a suspect in re-
sponse to questions asked of a third person in the presence of the suspect are voluntary. See
Haire v. Sarver, 437 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1971), and Stone v. United States, 385 F.2d 713
(10th Cir. 1967). But see Kamisar, supra note 41, at 51-52.
105. 100 S. Ct. at 1689. Custodial interrogation was defined in Miranda as police ques-
tioning "after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The rule of
Miranda, thus, was that one in custody is in an inherently coercive setting and no further
examination of coerciveness is necessary. Stone, supra note 59, at 136.
The Court's ruling in Innis, that custody is not inherently coercive, is not unprecedented.
In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), the Court ruled that agents of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service who visit a person's home in a preliminary tax evasion investigation are
not required to issue Miranda warnings. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
emphasized that Miranda concerns custodial interrogation, not inherently coercive settings.
Id. at 347-48. See Stone, supra note 59, at 149-50.
106. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 (emphasis added).
107. Id. In Brewer, Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, stated this test in somewhat differ-
ent terms, but in a conceptually similar manner, arguing that the exclusionary rule should
apply only when police conduct is egregious. 430 U.S. 387 at 422. See also Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part). Still another version of this test was
expressed in the majority opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), holding that
the exclusionary rule should not apply in a fifth amendment context if no evidence in the
record shows that the police acted in bad faith.
108. 100 S. Ct. at 1690. The Court's exposition of the suspect's perception as a primary
barometer of impermissible police conduct stands as a clear indication of the abandonment
of the per se test for admissibility of incriminating statements. See White, Police Trickery
in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PENN. L. REv. 581 (1979). White argues that the Court's
focus has not been upon the specific defendant but upon the police methods, "irrespective
of the likelihood that they did or could produce a false confession and irrespective of their
effect on the actual defendant before the court." Id. at 583-84 (emphasis in original).
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duct by stating that police are not accountable for "the unforesee-
able results of their words or actions," but only for "words or ac-
tions on the part of police officers that they should have known
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."109 Thus,
the test set out by the Court involves a complex two-prong interre-
lationship: a subjective prong, taking into account the susceptibil-
ity of a particular defendant, 10 and an objective prong, determin-
ing whether a reasonable police officer should have known his
words or actions would elicit an incriminating response."'
Applying this test to the facts of Innis, the Court found that the
functional equivalent of interrogation did not exist.' Instead, the
conversation between the two patrolmen represented "nothing
more than a dialogue between the two officers to which no response
from the respondent was invited." ' s The Court added that Innis
had not been subjected to the functional equivalent of questioning
because it could not be said that the officers "should have known
that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response from the respondent. 1 1 4
By finding that there was no interrogation under the facts in In-
nis, the Court avoided addressing the question of whether or not
the police violated Innis' right to counsel under the fifth amend-
ment. Thus, Innis stands within the letter, if not the spirit, of Mi-
randa, which provided only that all interrogation must cease if an
attorney is requested, not that an attorney must be present even if
there is no interrogation.115
109. 100 S. Ct. at 1690 (emphasis in original).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. Grano, in an article analyzing the state court decision in Innis, applies in a sixth
amendment context a test substantially similar to that devised by the Court in Innis in a
fifth amendment setting. Grano concludes that the officer should have known his remarks
would elicit an incriminating response. Grano, supra note 24, at 33.
113. 100 S. Ct. at 1690. It is perhaps noteworthy that Detective Learning in his Christian
burial speech in Brewer specifically told the defendant not to respond. Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977). Yet the Court had no difficulty in finding that Leaming set out
deliberately to elicit incriminating information. Id. at 399. In his dissent in Innis, Stevens
concludes that the fact that Officer Gleckman was assigned to share the back seat of the
police wagon with Innis can be viewed as indicative of an intent to elicit an incriminating
statement, especially since that procedure deviated from the usual police practice. Rhode
Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1697 (1980).
114. Id. at 1690. The Court also stated that the record showed no evidence that the
defendant "was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience .. .unusually disori-
ented or upset at the time of his arrest." Id. In contrast, the police officer in Brewer knew
that the defendant was a former mental patient and highly religious. 430 U.S. at 390-92.
115. 384 U.S. at 474.
1980]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 12
In a footnote in Innis, the Court indicated that the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's reliance upon Brewer had been misplaced." 6 The
Court pointed out that Brewer involved the sixth amendment right
to counsel, which bars law enforcement officers from " 'deliberately
elicit[ingl' incriminating information from a defendant in the ab-
sence of counsel after a formal charge against the defendant has
been filed. 11 7 Innis, on the other hand, involved the right to coun-
sel under the fifth amendment, which is triggered only by the initi-
ation of police interrogation.1 ' Moreover, the Court stated that the
definitions of interrogation under the fifth and sixth amendments
"are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying
the two constitutional protections are quite distinct." 9 The Court
failed, however, to elaborate what those distinct policies are or
what the noninterchangeable definitions of interrogation are. 20
116. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
117. Id. Grano views the sixth amendment right to counsel as prohibiting any attempt to
elicit information from an uncounseled defendant. Thus, he believes that under a sixth
amendment rationale, Innis would be not guilty. Grano, supra note 24, at 35. Grano's arti-
cle, however, was published prior to the Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Henry,
100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980). Under the new sixth amendment test announced in Henry, it is
arguable whether or not Innis would win. See note 131 infra.
118. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
119. Id. The footnote cites Kamisar, supra note 41, at 41-55, for the proposition that
custody alone is not sufficiently coercive to trigger the right to counsel under the fifth
amendment; there must also be compulsion. In an uncited portion of that article, however,
Kamisar argues that the compulsion necessary to trigger the fifth amendment right to coun-
sel can be slight. Id. at 23. Kamisar also argues strenuously that the defendant, especially if
he is indigent, is in need of greater protection in the post-arrest, pre-indictment period than
is afforded when interrogation has not begun. Kamisar also believes the sixth amendment
right to counsel is an active one even prior to interrogation. Id. at 99-101. See note 143
infra.
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the Innis judgement, questioned whether the footnote
in the majority decision provided sufficient clarification between the opinions in Innis and
Brewer. 100 S. Ct. at 1691 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
120. A question not raised in Innis, since the Court found that there was no interroga-
tion, was whether or not the defendant waived his fifth amendment right to counsel. Thus,
it remains unclear if a higher standard is required for waiver under the sixth amendment
than is required under the fifth amendment. In Brewer, the waiver standard imposed under
the sixth amendment is that of the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. 430 U.S. at
404.
In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), the Court ruled that the question of
waiver is determined by inquiring whether or not the defendant "knowingly and voluntarily
waived the rights" under Miranda. Id. at 373. Waiver is to be determined, the Court said,
by the facts and circumstances of the case. Id. at 374. Immediately following that statement
is a citation to Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), which stated the test used in Brewer.
304 U.S. at 464. In a concurring opinion in Butler, Justice Blackmun seemed to hint that
the test articulated by the majority was not that of Johnson v. Zerbst, but a less strict one.
441 U.S. at 376-77. Kamisar, supra note 41, at 70. Grano believes waiver should be more
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3. United States v. Henry
Although Innis failed to clearly explain why a fifth amendment
analysis was used in that case as opposed to the sixth amendment
analysis of Brewer, a decision announced five weeks after Innis
provides some guidance. In United States v. Henry,"' the issue
before the Court was whether the government impermissibly inter-
fered with an indicted defendant's sixth amendment right to coun-
sel when it retained as an informer another prisoner who occupied
the same cell block as the defendant. The Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Burger, held inadmissible incriminating statements
made by the defendant to the informant.' Applying the test origi-
nally set forth in Massiah, and later in Brewer, the Court in Henry
measured a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel on the basis of deliberate police elicitation of incriminating
statements."23 The Court added an additional element to the
Brewer-Massiah test, however, by stating that deliberate elicita-
tion occurs when police intentionally create a situation likely to
induce the defendant to make incriminating statements in the ab-
difficult under the sixth amendment than it is under the fifth amendment. Grano, supra
note 24, at 35 n.215.
An inquiry that the Court in Innis could have made, however, is whether or not the police
scrupulously honored the rights of the defendant under Miranda. See Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975). Mosley established this test to measure if statements taken after
Miranda warnings have been given are admissible. The suspect in Mosley had been arrested
for robbery. After warnings were administered, he declined to answer any questions. Two
hours later, he was rewarned by another police officer and questioned about a murder to
which he then confessed. Id. at 97-98. Refusing to apply a strict reading of Miranda, which
would have precluded admission of the confession, the Court defined the proper test as
whether or not the police scrupulously honored the suspect's rights under Miranda. Id. at
103. Stone views Mosley as adopting a balancing approach which he views as inconsistent
with Miranda and the effort of the Court in that case to create a per se rule. Stone, supra
note 59, at 135. Kamisar points out that a similar analysis could have been made in Brewer.
Kamisar, supra note 41, at 73. Stevens, in his dissent in Innis, argues that the Mosley test
of whether police scrupulously honored Innis' rights should have been applied. Under this
test, Innis' statements should have been excluded. 100 S. Ct. at 1694-95.
121. 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980).
122. Id. at 2189. Only defendants who have been indicted and whose sixth amendment
right to counsel has consequently attached are protected from the surreptitious elicitation of
information by government informers. Id. at 2188. The Henry Court stated that suspects
who have not been charged and who claim protection under the fourth or fifth amendment
are entitled to no protection against the elicitation of information by undercover agents. In
so holding, the Court explicitly upheld United States v. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (fourth
amendment not violated by use of evidence obtained by a government informer who mas-
queraded as a friend of an unindicted suspect).
123. 100 S. Ct. at 2186.
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sence of counsel.'" The Court held that the government in Henry
had created such a situation and that incriminating statements
had been deliberately elicited from Henry in violation of his sixth
amendment right to counsel. 25
Although the majority opinion clearly established the continued
vitality of Massiah, Justice Blackmun's dissent asserted that the
majority, while seeming to retain the Massiah-Brewer deliberate
elicitation test, actually established a new test. 26 Blackmun stated
that the majority's introduction of the words "likely to induce" de-
prived the word "deliberately" of all significance.22 He added that
the majority's extension of Massiah would cover "even a 'negli-
gent' triggering of events resulting in the elicitation of incriminat-
ing disclosures." 28
Brewer, Henry, AND Innis: A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE
The Court's choice of the fifth amendment Miranda rationale in
Innis and the sixth amendment Massiah rationale in Brewer and
Henry plainly signifies that the Court views the two privileges as
distinct. Two separate tests have been formulated for measuring
the permissibility of police activity. According to the Innis test,
interrogation for fifth amendment purposes occurs when the police
engage in either express questioning or its functional equivalent,
measured by the perception of the suspect and the intent of the
police.12 ' Pursuant to Brewer as modified by Henry, a sixth
amendment violation occurs when in the absence of counsel police
deliberately elicit incriminating statements by intentionally creat-
ing a situation likely to induce such statements. 80 The tests them-
selves, however, are substantially the same, although couched in
different language.'8 ' The Court's application of the tests reveals
124. Id. at 2189 (White, J., concurring).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2191.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690 (1980).
130. 100 S. Ct. 2183, 2189 (1980).
131. Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent in Henry that he was unable to discern "a
material difference between [the two] formulations." Id. at 2195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Even though the language of the two tests differs, their similarity can be demonstrated by
cross-application of the fifth and sixth amendment tests.
The Innis test for determining if police conduct is impermissible is whether the officer
should have known that his actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating re-
sponse based upon the intent of the police officer and the mental state of the suspect. 100 S.
Ct. at 1689-90. In Brewer, the Court specifically found that the police detective who accom-
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that the difference lies not in the tests but in the level of police
quasi-interrogation that the Court is likely to permit before finding
a violation of the suspect's rights. Given the same set of facts, the
Court is more likely to hold that the constitutional rights of a sus-
pect are violated when it finds that a sixth amendment, rather
than a fifth amendment, right to counsel has attached. 3 2
In rejecting a sixth amendment analysis, the Court in Innis ob-
served somewhat cryptically that it did so because distinct policies
underly the two rights. 3  Because the Court found it unnecessary
to explain this statement, it appears that the Court believes the
distinction is obvious from the historical background of the two
rights and from the cases applying them.
panied Williams to Des Moines made the Christian burial speech with the intent to evoke a
response from Williams. 430 U.S. at 399. In addition, the Court found that Williams, a
deeply religious man and a former mental patient, was likely to be especially vulnerable to
appeals to his conscience. The Court found further that police were aware of the defendant's
vulnerability. Id. at 392. Thus, application of the Innis test to the facts in Brewer would
result in the exclusion of the incriminating statements made by Williams.
Similarly, in Henry, the incriminating statements evoked by the informant would also be
inadmissible under the Innis test. The Court in Henry found the requisite intent, particu-
larly since the informant was to be paid only if he actually produced incriminating state-
ments. 100 S. Ct. at 2187. The Court also found that Henry, as a jailed prisoner, was espe-
cially susceptible to offers of friendship to relieve the strain of imprisonment, and thus
vulnerable to overtures from the informant. Id. at 2188. Consequently, the statements elic-
ited by the government, through the informant, would be inadmissible under the Innis test.
The Brewer-Henry test for impermissible police conduct involves the deliberate elicita-
tion of incriminating information by police who intentionally create a situation likely to
induce the prisoner to make incriminating statements. Id. at 2189. Although the Innis dis-
senters, 100 S. Ct. at 1692-98, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court, 391 A.2d at 1162,
found the requisite intent under the facts of Innis, it is arguable that the police in Innis did
not intend to create through their conversation a situation likely to induce the incriminating
statements. Thus, application of the Brewer-Henry test in Innis would result in finding the
statement admissible.
132. See notes 144-57 and accompanying test infra. Blackmun also pointed out in his
Henry dissent that the behavior of the police in Innis was more directly calculated to elicit
a response than was the police action in Henry. 100 S. Ct. at 2195. In Henry, government
agents retained a jailed informant to be alert to statements made on the cellblock by other
prisoners but not to initiate any conversations or ask any questions. Id. at 2194-95. Yet the
majority found the requisite deliberate elicitation. Id. at 2189.
Blackmun found the police behavior in Innis more egregious, yet he concurred with the
Innis majority that the statements were admissible. In Henry, he stated that in Innis the
defendant had "just been arrested at 4:30 a.m.; he was handcuffed and confined in a 'caged
wagon'; and the three police officers accompanying him triggered his confession by convers-
ing about the danger that a 'little girl' attending a nearby school for the handicapped would
'maybe kill herself' upon finding a gun he supposedly had hidden .... Against the back-
drop of Innis, I cannot fathom how the Court can conclude that [the government agent's]
actions rendered Henry's disclosures 'likely.'" Id. at 2195.
133. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
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Admittedly, the historical background of the rights to counsel
under the fifth and sixth amendments indicates that the two privi-
leges initially served different purposes."" The sixth amendment
was at first applied to safeguard the rights of an accused at trial
because the legally untrained defendant was not equipped to stand
alone, without counsel, against the state.135 Although early deci-
sions confined applicability of the right to the trial itself, the right
was later expanded to pretrial proceedings.13 6 The fifth amend-
ment right, in contrast, was traditionally broader in scope. It was
based upon the fundamental unfairness of compelling an accused
to be a witness against himself. The presence of an attorney during
interrogation, if requested by the accused, was viewed as necessary
to effectuate that right.13 7
Despite their separate sources, the fifth and sixth amendment
rights to counsel in modern criminal procedure serve a similar pur-
pose: to protect the defendant from unfair and deceptive law en-
forcement methods.1 8 The common purpose which both amend-
ments serve today therefore mandates that the analysis in cases
involving either the fifth or sixth amendment right to counsel
should be uniform.
The Court's continued differentiation between the rights to
counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments is more likely due to
its perception of the institution of formal judicial proceedings as
the critical stage at which the sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches.139 Formal judicial proceedings begin with a court appear-
ance for arraignment or formal charging.140 Although the Court in
Massiah, Kirby, and Henry clearly focuses upon this critical stage
factor under a sixth amendment rationale,4 the Court has failed
to articulate similar criteria in the context of the fifth amendment
134. See note 14 and note 52 supra.
135. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
136. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 51-58 and 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
138. Confessions, supra note 15, at 1016. See also notes 27-32 and 57-72 and accompa-
nying text supra.
139. See text accompanying note 32 supra. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the
Court ruled that there is no right to counsel in a pre-indictment police line-up. In so hold-
ing, the Court cited Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and a series of right-to-counsel
cases. "[A]IL of those cases have involved points of time at or after the initiation of adver-
sary judicial criminal proceedings - whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment." 406 U.S. at 689 (emphasis in original).
140. See notes 22-24 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
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right to counsel. Despite the lack of criteria, it would appear from
Innis that prior to indictment the suspect can claim only a fifth
amendment right to counsel. Innis implies that this fifth amend-
ment right to counsel is activated only by the initiation of custo-
dial police interrogation. Absent interrogation, the suspect has no
fifth amendment right to counsel at all, even if the suspect re-
quests the presence of an attorney.142
The right to counsel under the sixth amendment is similarly
triggered only by the institution of custodial interrogation.1 43 In
Brewer, the Court found that the Christian burial speech consti-
tuted interrogation; the defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel consequently attached to bar admission into evidence of
statements made by the defendant in the absence of counsel.144 In
contrast, the Court found in Innis that the handicapped child dia-
logue was not the functional equivalent of interrogation. Therefore,
the defendant had no fifth amendment right to counsel and the
statements elicited by police were admissible.1 45 Yet the differences
between the police behavior in Brewer and in Innis seem too slight
to justify freeing the defendant in Brewer and convicting the de-
fendant in Innis.
Although the Court found otherwise in Innis, it is difficult to
view the dialogue between the two officers as motivated by any-
thing else but the intention of eliciting an incriminating admission,
just as the Court found the detective in Brewer intended to obtain
a response to his Christian burial speech. 1' Both defendants were
142. See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra.
143. The concept that the rights to counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments are
triggered by police interrogation was suggested to the author by Professor Charles R. Pur-
cell of Loyola University of Chicago School of Law. The right to counsel under the fifth
amendment attaches at arrest, although police need not heed a request for counsel until
custodial interrogation begins. Miranda v. Arizona, 364 U.S. 436, 466 (1966). Similarly, the
right to counsel under the sixth amendment attaches at the onset of formal judicial proceed-
ings against the defendant, but is triggered only by interrogation. United States v. Massiah,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). Brewer, Innis, and Henry, however, demonstrate that the rights to
counsel under both amendments have little practical significance until interrogation is initi-
ated. See text accompanying notes 88, 112-15 and 123-25. But see Kamisar, supra note 42,
at 41-44. Kamisar argues that the sixth amendment right to counsel is an active one even
prior to interrogation.
144. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
145. See notes 106-14 and accompanying text supra.
146. In their Innis dissents, Marshall and Stevens argue convincingly that the police
specifically intended to elicit incriminating information from Innis. Marshall, joined by
Brennan, states that "[o]ne can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a
suspect - any suspect - than the assertion that if the weapon is not found an innocent
person will be hurt or killed. And not just any innocent person, but an innocent child - a
19801
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confined in a police vehicle accompanied only by two police of-
ficers. The police speech in each case was designed to appeal to the
conscience of the defendant, thereby inducing an incriminating
statement. Furthermore, each defendant had requested the pres-
ence of an attorney.
There are differences, to be sure, between the police conduct in
Innis and that in Brewer. The police speech in Brewer was di-
rected at the defendant, whereas the speech in Innis was a conver-
sation between the two police officers. The duration of confine-
ment, moreover, was shorter in Innis than in Brewer.1 47 Neither of
these factual distinctions, however, appears to have influenced the
Court. The factual distinction which appears to have been viewed
by the Court as controlling is the initiation of formal judicial pro-
ceedings against the defendant in Brewer but not against the sus-
pect in Innis.1 8 Because of the initiation of formal proceedings,
the Brewer defendant was entitled under the sixth amendment to
the presence of an attorney during interrogation.149 The Innis de-
fendant, in contrast, had merely been arrested, an occurrence
which in the Court's view did not mark the initiation of formal
judicial proceedings."" No sixth amendment right to counsel,
therefore, had attached. The defendant was entitled only to privi-
leges under the fifth amendment. The fact that the defendant in
Brewer had a right to counsel under the sixth amendment, whereas
Innis had a right to counsel under the fifth amendment, should
result in an equal level of protection for the defendants, since the
rights under each amendment are similar and are triggered by cus-
todial interrogation.1 51 Brewer, Henry, and Innis indicate, however,
little girl - a helpless, handicapped little girl on her way to school. The notion that such an
appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect were known to have some
special interest in handicapped children verges on the ludicrous." 100 S. Ct. at 1692 (em-
phasis in original).
Justice Stevens also agreed with this conclusion. "The Court's assumption that criminal
suspects are not susceptible to appeals to conscience is directly contrary to the teachings of
police interrogation manuals, which recommend appealing to a suspect's sense of morality as
a standard and often successful interrogation technique." 100 S. Ct. at 1697.
147. In Innis, the defendant was arrested and transported to the police station almost
immediately. After the police wagon had travelled approximately one mile, the incriminat-
ing statement was made. 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87. In Brewer, the police had progressed about
100 miles on a 160-mile trip when the "Christian burial" speech was made and the admis-
sions obtained. 430 U.S. at 392-93.
148. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
149. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
150. See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
151. See note 143 supra.
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that a defendant with a fifth amendment right to counsel receives
less protection from police misconduct than a defendant with a
sixth amendment right to counsel.
152
Since one primary goal of the rights to counsel under the fifth
and sixth amendments is deterrence of improper police conduct, 1as
the differentiation between the point at which the right to counsel
attaches under each amendment, as exemplified by Brewer and In-
nis, is artificial, illogical, and contrary to the teaching of Miranda.
The genesis for the Court's analysis in Miranda was the belief that
obtaining confessions by police trickery is reprehensible.'" The
logical extension of Miranda is that police trickery is equally rep-
rehensible whether it occurs before or after the artificial point of a
court appearance. The methods employed by the police and con-
doned by the Court in Innis resemble those which Miranda con-
demned.8 8 These methods also resemble the police conduct which
the Court in Brewer found constitutionally impermissible.'"6 While
the Court ratified the police conduct in Innis because the suspect
had only a fifth amendment right to counsel, it denounced the po-
lice conduct in Brewer because the defendant had made a brief
court appearance for arraignment. Because the rights to counsel
under both amendments are intended to deter impermissible po-
lice conduct, however, both rights should attach at the time of
arrest.1
7
Once the right to counsel attaches, the use of separate tests for
determining when interrogation occurs under the fifth and sixth
amendments will result in needless confusion for law enforcement
152. See note 142 supra.
153. Kauper has suggested that police abuses could be abolished by permitting interro-
gation only in open court. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for
the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932), reprinted in 73 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1974).
For a discussion of Kauper's foresightedness, see Kamisar, Kauper's "Judicial Examination
of the Accused" Forty Years Later - Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MicH.
L. REV. 15 (1974).
154. The Court, referring to confessions obtained by beating, whipping, and other forms
of brutality, said the limits upon custodial interrogation delineated in its Miranda opinion,
are necessary to eradicate mental as well as physical coercion. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 446-48, 453-55 (1966).
155. Id. at 451-52.
156. See text accompanying notes 87-88 supra.
157. Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in Y. KAMISAR, F. INBAU, AND T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME, 44-45
(A. Howard ed. 1965); Enker & Elsen, supra note 15, at 84-85; Herman, supra note 38, at
490-91; Traynor, supra note 37, at 673; Confessions, supra note 15, at 1006, 1009; Pretrial
Right, supra note 24, at 413 n.81; Chafee, Documents on Fundamental Human Rights, Pam-
phlet 2 (1951-52), at 541; White, supra note 5, at 58. But see Grano, supra note 24, at 2.
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agencies and the lower courts. A more practical approach by the
Court would be the formulation of a single objective test to be ap-
plied in the context of both the fifth and sixth amendments. Such
a test should be based upon whether or not a reasonable person in
the position of the suspect would believe he had been interro-
gated.'" This rule, in conjunction with recognition of the right to
counsel upon arrest, would insure an even-handed approach by the
courts and law enforcement personnel. At a minimum, however,
the analysis of what constitutes interrogation should not be predi-
cated on whether the fifth or sixth amendment is the matrix of
analysis.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Innis and Henry, it is apparent that the present
state of the rights to counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments
is uncertain. The Court's distinction between the fifth and sixth
amendment rights to counsel can be established only inferentially;
neither Innis nor Henry explicitly discusses the differences be-
tween the two rights.10' Consequently, although it is clear that the
Court views the rights as distinct, it is less clear why that distinc-
tion exists. Since the right to counsel under each amendment is
aimed at eliminating impermissible police conduct,160 a similar
analysis should be applied, and similar kinds of police activity tol-
erated, in each context.
Furthermore, while Innis appears to reaffirm Miranda,6 " and
158. This test was suggested by Justice Stevens in his Innis dissent. 100 S. Ct. at 1695. A
similar objective test has been framed by Stone, although advanced as a test for custody.
Stone, supra note 59, at 152-53. Factors urged by Stone to guide application of the test
include police behavior, the setting, the extent to which police had focused the investigation
on the individual, and the knowledge the suspect had of the evidence compiled by police. Id.
"This approach seems generally consistent with the underlying concerns of Miranda and at
the same time it avoids reliance upon self-serving statements of the police or the defendant,
eliminates the difficulties of determining states of mind, and does not hold the police re-
sponsible for the idiosyncrasies of particular defendants." Id. Stone believes that a subjec-
tive test which focuses upon the intent of the officers, the test proposed in Innis, contradicts
the spirit of Miranda. Id. at 153.
159. See text accompanying notes 115-28 supra.
160. Confessions, supra note 15, at 1016. See notes 27-32 and 57-72 and accompanying
text supra.
161. Burger said in his Innis dissent that he would "neither overrule Miranda, disparage
it, nor extend it at this late date." 100 S. Ct. at 1691.
However, the Burger Court has to some extent diluted Miranda through such decisions as
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (prior inconsistent statements admissible for im-
peachment purposes when Miranda warnings defectively administered); and Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975) (prior inconsistent statements admissible when police continue interro-
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Henry relies upon Massiah, 1 2 both decisions actually formulate
new tests based upon the mental state of the suspect and the in-
tent of the police. 163 The practical effect of these subjective tests
may be to revive the voluntariness test previously abandoned in
Miranda. That is, these tests may restore the necessity for a case-
by-case consideration of the permissibility of police conduct, thus
causing confusion among law enforcement agencies and lower
courts by undercutting the certainty which had been supplied by
Miranda.'" The Court could restore certainty by extending the
right to counsel to the post-arrest, pre-arraignment period. This
single analytical mode would comport with the goal of both the
fifth and sixth amendments of deterring police misconduct. Even if
gation and fail to honor the suspect's request for counsel). See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v.
New York, Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1218-21 (1971); Kent, Harris v. New York: The Death Knell of
Miranda and Walder?, 38 BRoOKLYN L. REV. 357, 360-61 (1971); Note, The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REV. 3, 51-52 (1971).
The Court also recently permitted the use of prearrest silence for impeachment purposes.
In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court ruled that a defendant's silence immedi-
ately after issuance of the Miranda warnings could not be used to impeach the defendant's
testimony at trial that he had been framed. Without overruling Doyle, the Court in Jenkins
v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980), ruled that the defendant's silence for two weeks, the
period prior to his surrender on murder charges, could be used to impeach his assertion of
self-defense. Id. at 4696.
Given the prominence of Miranda, the Court may feel that to directly overrule it would
call into question the integrity of the American judicial system based upon precedent. In-
stead, the Court may have chosen the slow process of indirectly overruling Miranda. See
Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. Rv. 211, 218-19.
Stone views the present membership of the Court as anti-Miranda. Stone, supra note 59,
at 100. Other commentators agree. See, e.g., Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifth
Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 430-31 (1977); Note,
Michigan v. Tucker: A Warning about Miranda, 17 ARMz. L. REV. 188, 213 (1975).
162. 100 S. Ct. at 2186.
163. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
164. See note 62 supra for a description of the difficulties and inconsistent results in the
courts with the voluntariness analysis. Even Grano, who urges a return to the voluntariness
test, concedes that a per se rule eliminates the need for case-by-case analysis. Grano, supra
note 24, at 46.
Stone views Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), as signalling the return to the vol-
untariness test through its balancing test. Stone, supra note 59, at 118. In Tucker, the de-
fendant had been given Miranda warnings but had not been told counsel would be ap-
pointed if he was indigent. Evidence obtained as a result of his statements following that
incomplete warning was admissible, the Court said, because the incomplete warning did not
deprive him of his privilege under the fifth amendment, but only of the procedural safe-
guards of Miranda. Id. at 444. Police conduct was inadvertent, and the information ob-
tained was reliable. Id. at 444-45. The Court's description of Miranda rights as mere proce-
dural safeguards seems inconsistent, Stone observes, with the declaration in that case that
the warnings are fundamental to the fifth amendment privilege. Stone, supra note 59, at
119.
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the Court is unwilling to adopt a uniform rationale, the confusion
would be mitigated, if not entirely eliminated, by the Court's rec-
ognition that the separate fifth and sixth amendment tests, as set
forth in Innis and Henry, should be resolved into a single test
which could be employed in the context of both the fifth and sixth
amendment rights to counsel.
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